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Evidence-Admissibility in Civil Actions of Evidence Illegally Obtained by Private Persons
Evidence illegally obtained by a trespass or a breaking and entering by private persons is freely admissible in civil actions. In
Sackler v. Sackler' the New York Court of Appeals rejected the
attempt of a lower court to abandon this universal rule.2 A divorce
granted to the husband on grounds of adultery was allowed to
stand, though the evidence used, including photographs, was obtained by the husband and private detectives in a predawn forcible
entry of the wife's separately maintained apartment.8
The courts have constantly sought effective means of protecting
persons from illegal searches. In England in 1762-1763 messengers
of King George III conducted an infamous series of searches,
seeking evidence of seditious libel. General warrants issued as authority for the searches were declared illegal, and trespass actions
instituted by the search victims resulted in substantial damage
judgments against the messengers and against the Earl of Halifax
who, as Secretary of State, issued the warrants.4 These actions
are early and prominent examples of the traditional means used in
the courts' attempts to control illegal searches-damages from the
searchers are relied upon to discourage such acts of trespass, however much success on the principle issue as a direct result of the
illegal search may encourage them.
1 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964),
aflrming 16
App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61, reversing 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d
790 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
'See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (McNaughton rev. 1961) for the
rationale of the non-exclusionary rule. E.g.:
It does not, logically, follow, however that records, being obtained
can not be used as instruments of evidence, for the mere fact of [illegally] obtaining them does not change that which is written in them....
Suppose the presence of a witness to have been procured by fraud or
violence, while the party thus procuring the attendance of the witness
would be liable to severe punishment, surely that could not be urged
against the competency of the witness !
Stevison v. Earnest, 80 Ill. 513, 517-18 (1875). See also Commonwealth v.
Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841).
'33 Misc. 2d at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
'Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1742, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765); Entick
v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood,
2 Wils. 203, 95 Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B. 1763). More detailed reports of these
cases can be found at 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1001, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029, and
19 Howell's St. Tr. 1153, respectively.
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A concept of exclusion was introduced into American law in
1886 when the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Boyd v. United States.' In that opinion Mr. Justice
6
Bradley described Lord Camden's opinion in Entick v. Carrington
'
as "one of the landmarks of English liberty' 7 and an incentive to
the adoption of the fourth amendment.' But in Boyd the Court
found it necessary to rely upon the fifth amendment's protection
against self-incrimination to declare erroneous and unconstitutional
the introduction of evidence obtained by a process it deemed an
illegal search.'
In Weeks v. United States,"° twenty-eight years after Boyd
and ten years after exclusion based solely on the fourth amendment
had been considered but rejected in Adams v. New York," the
Court finally made it clear that the federal rule would be to exclude evidence in criminal cases when it had been seized in violation of the fourth amendment. While limiting the rule to unconstitutional searches made by officers of the federal government and
its agencies, 2 Mr. Justice Day, speaking for a unanimous Court,
reasoned:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment ...is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution.'8
But in Burdeau v. McDowell" the Court refused to invoke
this protective rule when the unconstitutional searches or seizures
-116 U.S. 616 (1886).
'2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
1116 U.S. at 626.
'The amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
o Wigmore approves the decision as "dorrect on simple Fifth Amendment
grounds" but asserts that it made "fallacious conclusions" as to the fourth
amendment. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2184a at 32.
10232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11192 U.S. 585 (1904). See 232 U.S. at 396, where the Weeks Court
attempts to distinguish the decision in this case.
232 U.S. at 398.
8Id.at
393.
'256 U.S. 465 (1921).
12
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were by private persons, even when federal officials proposed to use
evidence thus obtained in criminal prosecutions. 15 Mr. Justice
Day, speaking for the majority,16 said of the fourth amendment:
Its origin and history dearly show that it was intended to
be a restraint on the activities of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies ....

In the present case the record clearly shows that no official
of the Federal Government had anything to do with the wrongful seizure .... We assume that the petitioner has an unques-

tionable right of redress against those who illegally and wrongfully took his private property under the circumstances herein17
disclosed, but with such remedies we are not now concerned.
In People v. Defore,'I a 1926 decision, Judge Cardozo, then on
the New York Court of Appeals, had to consider whether, in the
light of the federal exclusionary rule manifested in Weeks, the
state of New York should adopt a like policy. Both New York
and the Supreme Court had rejected such a policy in Adams.
Cardozo found nothing in the controlling New York statute"
whereby official trespasses and private are differentiated in respect of the legal consequences to follow them ....

Evidence is

not excluded because the private litigant who offers it has gathered
it by lawless force. By the same token, the State, when proseagainst the peace and order of society, incurs
cuting an offender 20
no heavier liability.

Cardozo found the federal exclusionary rule "either too strict
21
And he
or too lax. . . . We must go farther or not so far."
chose not to go so far because
the Legislature, which created it [the statute], has acquiesced
in the ruling of this court that the prohibition of the search did
not anathematize the evidence yielded through the search. If we
a few
had misread the statute or misconceived the public policy,
22
words of amendment would have quickly set us right.
18

Id. at 470, 476.

Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes dissented. Id. at 476.
17
Id.at 475.
18242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
"8N.Y. Civ. RIGns LAw § 8. In 1938 this became part of the New
1

York state constitution. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12. The law is identical in
wording with the fourth amendment. See note 8 supra.
2 242 N.Y. at 21-22, 150 N.E. at 588.
21
Id.at 22, 150 N.E. at 588.
2
-Id.at 23, 150 N.E. at 588.
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The United States Supreme Court eventually concluded that
searches and seizures by state officers might violate the fourteenth
amendment when the fourth amendment standard of reasonableness
was not met, but for a long period the Court, like Cardozo, refused
to widen the consequences. 3
Of course, Mapp v. Ohio24 changed all this. After refusing to
allow federal officers to continue to turn over illegally seized evidence to state officers for state court prosecutions, 25 and destroying
the "silver platter" doctrine that permitted evidence of federal
crime illegally obtained by state officers to be used in federal
courts, the Court in Mapp forced the states, including New
York,2 7 to go just so far as the federal rule. The Court declared
that "time [had] . . . set its face against . . . the 'weighty testi-

mony' ,,28 of Defore and reasoned that a uniform, if still severely
limited, 9 rule of exclusion was "not only the logical dictate of
prior cases, but it also makes very good sense."' 0
" See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Salsburg v. Maryland,
346 U.S. 545 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

" Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
"' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
"People v. Loria, 10 N.Y.2d 368, 179 N.E.2d 478, 223 N.Y.S.2d 462
(1961).
28 367 U.S. at 653.
" As it now stands, the federal exclusionary rule in criminal cases: (a)
applies to evidence obtained as an indirect result of the illegal search-to the
"fruits of the poisonous tree," Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920), including verbal evidence obtained after an illegal
entry, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); (b) does not
operate to quash indictments based on tainted evidence, Lawn v. United
States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) ; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) ;
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) ; (c) probably need not be raised by
pretrial motion for suppression where the prosecution's evidence discloses
the illegality for the first time, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ;
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) ; (d) applies to suppress contraband, though not to
compel its return, Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948) ; (e) does not apply to searches or seizures by private persons,
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); (f) applies only to searches of
"'persons, houses, papers, and effects,'"H ester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924), but automobiles are within the rule, Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925); (g) applies only to searches invading defendant's own
privacy, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) ; (h) may be invoked
by a corporate defendant, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra;
(i) applies only to evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment
standard, with rare exception, Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958)
(violation of D.C. local statute).
30

367 U.S. at 657.
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Against this progression on the criminal side, it is, at first,
strange that until Sackler was decided by the trial court no reported American court, with one limited exception,8 1 had extended
any like protection on the civil side.82 However, since it is apparently still the rule that evidence illegally seized by private persons is not to be excluded in state88 or federal 4 criminal actions,
it is perhaps not so surprising, at least to one trained in legal
niceties. The trial court, in excluding the Sackler evidence, thought
the non-applicability of the exclusionary rule to seizures by per5
sons other than federal agents (state officers or private persons)
"appears to have been overruled by Elkins v. United States.""0
In his dissent, Judge Van Voorhis of the Court of Appeals also
thought the ElkinS' 7 rejection of the "silver platter" doctrine should

8
apply when the platter is offered by a private individual as well. "
But the Court of Appeals majority's insistence that Burdeau's
"definitive holding that the Fourth Amendment has nothing to do

with nongovernmental intrusions . . . has never been overruled in

this respect," 30 is probably more accurate. This had been the
Appellate Division's conclusion in reversing the trial court. 0
If this is so, the fourth amendment is a poor peg on which to
hang a civil exclusionary rule. And, despite Judge Bergan's extra3 Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958). This case
would exclude evidence of alcohol in a blood sample taken from defendant by

a nurse at the direction of a state police officer, a violation of security of the
person, and its application is probably limited to such extreme facts. Compare Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
" See, e.g., Hair v. McGuire, 188 Cal. App. 2d 348, 10 Cal. Rptr. 414
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (no violation of federal mail law in seizure of evidence); Walker v. Penner, 190 Ore. 542, 227 P.2d 316 (1951) (personal
injury; error in excluding whiskey bottle illegally taken from defendant's
car by plaintiff's husband); Hartman v. Hartman, 253 Wis. 389, 34 N.W.2d
137 (1948) (divorce for adultery; no illegal search, but dictum that illegal
search would not prevent admission of evidence).
" See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 153 Cal. App. 2d 870, 315 P.2d 468 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1957).
' See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).

8 Ibid.

"33 Misc. 2d at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 793. See also Williams v. United
States, 282 F.2d 940, 941 (6th Cir. 1960).
s Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
203 N.E.2d at 484, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
88 15 N.Y.2d at -,
8 Id. at -, 203 N.E.2d at 483, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
,0 16 App. Div. at -,

229 N.Y.S.2d at 63. Justice Hopkins disagreed.

Id. at -, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 67 (dissenting opinion).
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polation from Cardozo in Defore,41 similar state statutory or constitutional provisions 42 are probably no better.
In England, where the doctrine behind such provisions first
developed, "the question [of exclusion] has apparently arisen very
infrequently, '4 on either the criminal or civil side. There has been
little discussion of illegal governmental seizures since the oft-quoted
4 4 opinion of Lord Camden in 1765, and exEntick v. Carrington
clusion of evidence so seized is apparently discretionary with the
trial judge.4 5 However, in one English civil case46 an exclusionary
policy was announced, the evidence being copies 47 of privileged
communications between attorney and client obtained "by collusion ' 4 between the defendant and the attorney's clerk. An injunction was allowed against production of the copies as evidence.
Cozzens-Hardy, Master of the Rolls, saw "no ground whatever
in principle why we should decline to give the plaintiff the protection which in my view is his right as between him and
defendant] .-4

. . .

[the

This is a somewhat backhanded statement of what perhaps
is a better basis for an exclusionary rule in civil actions. Not
the fourth amendment, but something akin to the equitable doctrine of clean hands 50 and the common law maxim: "No one can
take advantage of his own wrong."'" However strictly a court is
" 15 N.Y.S.2d at -, 203 N.E.2d at 485, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (dissenting
opinion). See text accompanying note 21 supra.
E.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15, which provides:
General warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not
particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty
and ought not to be granted.

,'Cowen, The Admissibility of Evidence Procured Through Illegal
Seizures in British Commonwealth Jurisdictions,5 VAND. L. REv. 523, 528
(1952).
"2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
"15 HALsBURY's LAwS OF ENGLAND, Evidence § 487 (Simonds ed. 1956).
"0 Ashburton v. Pape, [1913] 2 Ch.469.
" Nor, because of the privilege, could the originals be introduced. Id. at
473. They had to be returned to the attorney. Id. at 472. Compare LeLong
v. Siebrecht, 196 App. Div. 74, 187 N.Y. Supp. 150 (1921). See generally 8
WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 2325, 2326; N.Y. CPLR § 4503.
" [1913] 2 Ch.at 471.
"Id.
at 473.
oSee McCLINTOCK, EQuITY § 26 (2d ed. 1948).
"BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 952 (Gavit ed. 1941).
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engaged in the matter strictly before it, can it afford to ignore
the type of conduct its blindness may encourage in private persuit against the
sons ?52 The traditional legal remedy of a trespass
3
inadequate.5
certainly
almost
is
illegal searchers
Something of this argument is implicit in the trial court's
decision in Sackler. There Judge Brenner pointed out that "the
divorce laws of the State of New York, confined as they are to
the single cause of adultery are outmoded and archaic ....

Hence,

they foster disrespect of the law which the courts are powerless
to halt.""4 He also noted that direct evidence of adultery, as might
"The
be obtained in a raid, frequently staged, is unnecessary.
continued disclosure of evidence of adultery procured in violation
of fundamental civil liberties thus works a double harm upon the
integrity of the judicial process.""6
Judge Bergan's dissent in the Court of Appeals echoes this
point:
It is not possible to draw a fully logical difference on the
question of admissibility between evidence wrongfully obtained
by a private citizen and evidence wrongfully obtained by public
authority. Indeed, since the motivation of public authority is the
common good of the community and the motivation of the pri"Plaintiff's conduct in Sackler was not the innocent procedural error so
often made by police, unskilled in constitutional subtleties, but a deliberate,
planned trespass. 33 Misc. 2d at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 794. Plaintiff was
accompanied by private detectives who had equipped themselves in advance
to take photographs of what they found. Suppose a raid had been conducted
by the wife instead of by the husband, and she had been the plaintiff in a
New York divorce action. Her conduct might have prevented her from
obtaining alimony. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 236, making the award of
alimony discretionary with the court. However, if the wife herself is guilty
of adultery, the court cannwt award her alimony, though her husband is guilty
of the same conduct, and no matter who seeks the divorce.
"' Quaere, if the wife-defendant in Sackler were to sue the husbandplaintiff for trespass, would her loss of alimony be an element of damages?
Probably not; her recoverable damages may be purely nominal. But see
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925),
modifying 261 S.W. 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) (damages allowed for
destruction of speculative value). Compare Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo.
166, 253 Pac. 862 (1927). See generally 11 CoRNEm L. Q. 416 (1926); 48
HARv. L. REv. 485 (1935); 4 TEXAS L. REv. 215 (1926); 36 YALE L. J.
1167 (1927). For the difficulties that arise in suing the perpetrators of an
unconstitutional search, see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), on remand,
71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
5' 33 Misc. 2d at -,
5

Id.

at

"Id. at

-,
-,

224 N.Y.S.2d at 796.

224 N.Y.S.2d at 795.

224 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
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vate citizen the advantage of his lawsuit, it might be supposed
we would more readily suppress wrongfully taken evidence in
the private suit than in the criminal action.57
In allowing the use of evidence obtained by illegal acts by
private persons is a court not involved in unconstitutional state
action as in Shelley v. Kraemer?" In Shelley it was held violative
of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause for a court
to enforce a privately-made restrictive covenant. Is not the Sackler
court, in allowing the illegally seized evidence, giving validity to an
act that would violate the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause if performed by any other branch of government? One
writer has distinguished the court's role in Sackler as merely passive,5 9 noting also that the concept of Shelley has yet to be applied to any but racial segregation cases."
As Sackler suggests, the present state of the law is "clear and
plain,"'" and the only hope for change is in state legislatures,
despite the Sackler defendant's attempt to ride "the crest of [Mapp
and subsequent] . . . holdings."62 Mapp, of course, indicates the
reluctance of many states to adopt an exclusionary rule on the
criminal side. But in civil litigation the interest that would be
harmed by an exclusionary rule, that of private litigants who have
committed illegal acts themselves rather than that of the public as
a whole, seems hardly as meritorious. Some moves have been
made. For example, New York has by statute adopted an exclusionary rule as to wiretap evidence in civil actions, while per57 15 N.Y.2d at -, 203 N.E.2d at 485, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 88. Judge Bergan
also argues that the landmark New York decision (Defore) "makes [it]
quite clear that there is no distinction under the New York Civil Rights
Law ... between a private and a public invasion of privacy." Ibid.
"334 U.S. 1 (1948).
"46 MINN. L. REV. 1119 (1962). "In Shelley the lower court was asked
to compel a private citizen to do an act which would be unconstitutional for
the state to perform, whereas in the instant case the court was merely asked
to give evidentiary status to illegally seized information." Id. at 1124-25.
As to passive state action, consider Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v.
Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983
(1956).
6046 MINN. L. REv. 1119, 1125 (1962).
203 N.E.2d at 484, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
01 15 N.Y.2d at -,
"33 Misc. 2d at -, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
0"N.Y. CPLR § 4506. In Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961), the exclusionary rule was applied to electronic eavesdropping by
federal officers.
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cases.6 4

It hardly seems that
mitting such evidence in criminal
courts are significantly hindered in their search for the truth by
such rules. And, if exclusion is to continue to be the rule in
criminal cases, there is little logic in not extending it to civil
litigation as well. 5
CHARLES B. ROBSON, JR.

Guardian and Ward-Estate Planning-Gifts by Guardian from
Estate of Incompetent Ward
Petitioner in In re Trusteeship of Kenyan,' as trustee of the person and estate of an incompetent ward, sought authority, pursuant
to legislative enactments, 2 to make gifts from the ward's income;'
to make gifts from the principal of the ward's estate ;4 and, with
regard to an inter vivos trust created by the incompetent, to surrender a reserved right of revocation and to make charitable gifts
of the income therefrom which had been reserved to the incompetent
for her lifetime. 5 On the first appeal,' the lower court orders 7 granting the requested authority were reversed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court on the ground that the lower court's finding that
the incompetent, if competent and heeding sound advice, would
make the gifts was not supported by the evidence. Petitioner, apparently having relied solely on the statutes in his initial pleadings,
was given leave to obtain permission to amend his petitions to al" N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-a; N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12. See People
v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406, cert. denicd,
371 6U.S. 877 (1962).
With sponsorship of the Bar Association of the City of New York, a
commission to review and make recommendations on all aspects of the antiquated New York divorce laws has been proposed to the 1965 New York
Legislature. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1965, p. 38, col. 2. If such a
commission is established, it would be well for it to consider as a part of its
task the evidentiary implications of these laws as they are illustrated by the
Sackler case.
1261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1963) ; 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
2
N.C. GEx. STAT. §§ 35-29.1 to -29.16 (Supp. 1963).
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.1 to -29.4 (Supp. 1963).
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.5 to -29.10 (Supp. 1963).
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.11 to -29.16 (Supp. 1963).
'In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1963).
Three separate proceedings took place in the superior court-one relating
to gifts from income, another to gifts from principal, and the last to surrendering the right to revoke the trust and the lifetime income interest.
Thus, three orders were issued below, and the proceedings were consolidated for purposes of appeal.

